South African natural person insolvency law has remained largely creditor-orientated despite the international trend to assist over-indebted debtors. Furthermore, although the South African system provides for a number of debt relief procedures, the entry requirements are of such a nature that most debtors are effectively excluded from any form of relief and therefore bound to their desperate situations. The majority of these excluded debtors fall within the no income and no assets (the so-called No Income No 2 Asset (NINA) debtors) category-the main feature of this article. In the South African insolvency system, a person can therefore be 'too poor to go bankrupt'. With reference to international principles and a thorough comparative study of the New Zealand system, the South African system is analysed, and some recommendations are made in order to provide a more accessible, effective and nondiscriminate system with specific focus on the plight of the NINA debtor. This is done by keeping the complex South African debt and poverty situation in mind as it is acknowledged that any reform should take cognisance of the unique socio-economic and cultural background. It is recognised that providing relief to the NINA category debtors will have an impact on the economy.
Introduction
Despite the world-wide trend to accommodate over-burdened consumer debtors seeking debt relief, the South African insolvency system has remained largely creditororientated and does not provide adequate relief to over-indebted consumers.
1 Furthermore, though the South African system provides for a number of debt relief procedures, the entry requirements are of such a nature that most debtors are effectively excluded and therefore bound to their desperate plight.
2 illustrate the lack of and need for a measure catering for NINA debtors, which is the core feature of this article. We also consider reform initiatives currently on the table to determine whether there is a possibility that the system will improve as far as this particular group is concerned. The insolvency procedures in New Zealand with specific focus on the no asset procedure are discussed next. The purpose is to compare the two systems in order to identify the lessons to be learnt from the New Zealand system. This is followed by our recommendations for South Africa and conclusions.
Socio-economic conditions and levels of over-indebtedness in South Africa
It is important to understand the reality and background against which this research is intended. In the discussion below an indication of the levels of over-indebtedness and some of the socio-economic conditions that South Africans face today are therefore given.
The South African economy is regularly described as dual in nature as it contains two different sectors, namely, the developed economy and the underdeveloped or developing economy, with almost no middle ground. 19 This dualism provides for a complex so- 25 The number of South Africans liable for personal income tax stands in stark contrast to this figure. Even though the South African Revenue Services (SARS) reported a growth in the individual tax register from 1.7 million in 1994 to 6 million in 2010, the number is still very low. Furthermore, SARS reported a further growth to 13.7 million in 2012 following a policy change to register all individuals in formal employment. 26 This figure obviously does not reflect the number of individuals actually liable for or paying personal income tax, as all salary earners, irrespective of whether they are liable for individual income tax, must now be registered with SARS. 20 The World Bank, Poverty Headcount Ratio at national poverty line (% of population) <http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-africa> 'accessed 31 May 2013'. 21 The report defines unemployed persons as those (aged 16-64) years) who: a) were not employed in the reference week and; b) actively looked for work or tried to start a business in the four weeks preceding the survey interview and; c) were available for work, i.e. would have been able to start work or a business in the reference week or; d)
had not actively looked for work in the past four weeks but had a job or business to start at a definite date in the future and were available. 22 Since June 2007 there has been an on-going decline in the number of South African consumers in 'good standing'. 27 At the end of December 2012, credit bureaux had records of 19.97 million credit active consumers, of which 9.34 million had impaired credit records. Thus, at present only 53.2% of credit-active consumers are in 'good standing', 28 which is a clear indication of the urgent need to afford some form of relief to over-burdened consumers. The National Credit Act, which became fully effective on 1
June 2007, shielded South Africa to some extent from the worst of the worldwide economic meltdown. The stringent measures to prevent reckless credit granting and overindebtedness appears to have come at just the right time, but unfortunately, as is indicated below, the Act offers no remedial measures once a consumer finds him-or herself in a debt trap.
If a debtor in South Africa fails to pay his or her debt, the creditor will eventually obtain judgment (in most instances default judgment) against such debtor. 29 It is important to note that no natural person with full contractual capacity is protected from debt enforcement procedures prior to a court order placing such person under one of the debt relief measures as mentioned above. Once a credit provider has obtained a judgment it will only prescribe after a period of 30 years has lapsed. 30 In practice, even though it may be difficult to collect on such debt, these debtors are harassed by credit providers 27 'Good standing' refers to 'An account or consumer showing as current or on which the client has not missed more than one or two instalments, which has no adverse listings and has no judgments.' National Credit Regulator, Credit Bureaux Monitor First Quarter (December 2012) -available at www.ncr.org.za 'accessed 31 May 2013'. 28 National Credit Regulator (n 27). 29 In most cases judgment will be obtained from the magistrates' courts. These are the lower courts which function within the framework of the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944. 30 This statement is concerned with extinctive prescription -Prescription Act 68 of 1969, s 11. The Act applies to debts arising after 1 December 1970. There are two forms of prescription, namely extinctive and acquisitive prescription. Extinctive prescription refers to the situation where legal obligations are extinguished through lapse of time whilst acquisitive prescription refers to the situation where ownership of another's property can be acquired once a period of 30 years have lapsed.
and can technically be the subject of harassment for a period of at least 30 years. 31 In the event that a debtor is employed in the formal sector, a common collection instrument, the emoluments attachment order, may be used to effectively collect on the judgment debt. 32 In terms of such an order an employer is obliged to deduct instalments from the debtor's salary and pay these amounts over to the creditor. 33 There is no statutory prescription as to the percentage of the salary or wage that may be attached. Furthermore, neither the credit provider nor the clerk of the court granting the order is aware of other emoluments attachment orders already made against the debtor's salary. There is generally no enquiry into the financial affairs of the debtor and the creditor often unilaterally decides on the amount of the instalment. If a substantial part (or the whole of -which is not a rare phenomenon) of a debtor's salary is attached in this manner, it leaves the latter with no means to provide for him-or herself and dependants. 34 The debtor is in such instances forced to resign 35 and seek employment in the informal sector. 36 The system forces these debtors to such measures as they are not protected by the law. If they cannot find a source of income in the informal sector, these debtors become a social burden on the South African economy. It is therefore submitted that some aspects of the individual enforcement system coupled with the exclusivity of the broader insolvency regime entrenches the reality of the dual South African economy. The system in some in- 36 The informal sector refers to the unstructured economy in developing countries where individuals are not formally employed, but are engaged in entrepreneurial activities which does not adhere to legal requirements, standards and procedures. Such individuals refrain from entering the formal economy as once they do so, their wages will again be attached. These entrepreneurs are amongst others street vendors, hairdressers, musicians, artisans etc. Introduction
The three statutory debt relief measures available to some over-extended South African consumers will be discussed and analysed in this section. It is important to take note of the multiplicity of regulators, intermediaries, access requirements, procedures, decision making forums and legislation in order to fully comprehend the intricacies of the South African insolvency landscape and the exclusion of the NINA debtor. Sequestration in terms of the Insolvency Act will firstly be discussed as it is deemed to be the primary debt relief measure, because it is the only statutory measure that provides a discharge of pre-insolvency debt. The administration procedure in terms of section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act and debt review in terms of section 86 of the National Credit Act will consequently be discussed. Reform initiatives will lastly be considered to ascertain whether it will fill some of the gaps in the current system. Each of these measures will in conclusion be analysed as to their appropriateness to the NINA situation.
Sequestration
The primary object of the South African Insolvency Act is to ensure an orderly and fair distribution of the debtor's assets in circumstances where these assets are insufficient to satisfy all the creditors' claims. Once a sequestration order has been made a concursus creditorum comes into being and the rights of the creditors as a group are preferred to the rights of individual creditors. 37 As mentioned, it is not a primary object of the Insol- appear that the Commission's motivation in this regard is to ensure that sequestration, which is an expensive process to follow, would only be resorted to if it would be costeffective to do so: that is, if the proceeds of the free residue would be sufficient to cover the costs of sequestration and to provide a not-negligible dividend to creditors.
55
Concerning the administration of a sequestrated estate, the Master of the High Court 56 is tasked with the supervision of South African insolvency law in the narrow sense. 57 Although difficult to define its role, it can be said that it is that of a regulator. After appointment, control of the estate vests in the trustee who inter alia has the power and duty to realise property and distribute the proceeds among creditors as provided for in the Act. 
Administration
Administration orders are regulated by section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act. 59 Boraine 60 describes the order as 'a debt relief measure available to some debtors that find themselves in financial distress, which affords them the opportunity to obtain a statutory rescheduling of debt sanctioned by a court order'. Administration involves a relatively simple and inexpensive procedure whereby overcommitted debtors' obligations are rescheduled. 61 These orders are intended for smaller estates where sequestration would 'swallow the assets' 62 and the aim is mainly to assist the debtor during a period of financial embarrassment. 63 The procedure does not provide for any discharge of debts or costs 64 and no maximum time limit in relation to the payment is set. The order will only lapse once all listed creditors as well as the cost of administration have been paid in full.
65
Administration orders are intended to be utilised where the debtor is unable to satisfy a judgment debt or to meet his or her financial obligations and where he or she does not have sufficient assets to attach in satisfaction of such judgment or obligations. 66 However, in some instances the court may authorise the administrator, appointed by the court and tasked with the administration of these estates, to sell some of the assets in order to distribute the proceeds amongst creditors. 67 The administration order can thus be seen as a hybrid debt relief measure as it makes provision for both the rescheduling of debt and the realisation of assets to service debts. Once the order has been granted, investigation, and a reform project was registered as Project 127. This project was suspended, pending the promulgation of the National Credit Act. However, contrary to expectations, the National Credit Act did not deal with administration orders, and on 1 May 2011 a workshop was held at the University of Pretoria where various interest groups were consulted on proposed amendments of the process provided for by section 74. The suggested amendments mainly focus on technical and procedural aspects. However, the proposal does provide for a discharge after eight years subject to specified conditions, which is certainly a step in the right direction as far as debt relief is concerned. 
Debt review
One of the aims of the National Credit Act 76 is to provide for debt relief through debt reorganisation in cases of over-indebtedness. 77 Section 86 contains the major debt relief mechanism introduced by the Act, namely, debt review. 78 However, the Act does not strive to address over-indebtedness by providing a discharge to over-indebted consum- o b l i g a t i o n s b u t t o a c h i e v e e i t h e r a v o l u n t a r y d e b t r e -a r r a n g e m e n t o r a d e b t r earrangement by the Magistrate's Court'.
The debt review process commences with a consumer applying to a debt counsellor to be declared over-indebted and to be placed under debt review. 81 There are no monetary limitations on the total outstanding debt, which inter alia distinguishes debt review from the administration order and allows more consumers to qualify for debt relief in terms of the National Credit Act. Secured credit agreements are furthermore included in the review, but the Act does not provide any preference regarding the repayment thereof.
If debt review is evaluated as a debt relief measure intended to serve as an alternative to sequestration, one cannot ignore its intrinsic shortcomings. Firstly, the Act only applies to credit agreements as defined in section 8. 93 Debts that do not qualify as such will therefore be excluded from the debt review procedure. These may include delictual (tort) claims, clothing accounts, professional services as well as municipal accounts where no interest is charged. Another exclusion relates to agreements where the credit provider has proceeded to take steps in order to enforce the agreement. 94 In this regard, A credit provider will thus in effect be able to prevent a consumer from including a particular credit agreement in the debt review by merely forwarding a section 129 notice to such consumer once he or she is in default.
Insolvency law reform initiatives
T ) provides that 'an application in terms of this section may not be made in respect of, and does not apply to, a particular credit agreement if, at the time of that application, the credit provider under that credit agreement has proceeded to take the steps contemplated in section 129 to enforce that agreement'. 98 The s 129(1)(a) notice is a letter which a credit provider must send to a defaulting consumer before such credit provider may commence legal proceedings to enforce the agreement. 99 The Insolvency Bill uses the term 'liquidation' when referring to both liquidation of juristic persons and sequestration of natural persons. 100 The title of the proposed provision is confusing as it could mistakenly be interpreted to require a composition as a pre-condition for insolvency proceedings. The 2010 Insolvency Bill provides for a binding composition between a debtor and creditors if it is accepted by the required majority in number and two-thirds in value of the concurrent creditors who vote on the composition. 105 The composition is supervised by the court and provision is made for an investigation into the affairs of the debtor.
106
The claims or rights of secured or preferent creditors shall only be subject to the composition if they consented thereto in writing. After the court has certified that the composition is accepted it will be binding on all creditors who have been informed of the hearing or appeared at the hearing. 107 The composition does not constitute a bar to the liquidation of the debtor's estate. 108 If the required majority does not accept the composition and the debtor is unable to pay substantially more than what is offered in the composition, the court must declare that the proceedings have ceased and that the debtor is in the position that he or she was in prior to commencement thereof. Alternatively, the court must determine whether or not section 74 of the Magistrates' Courts Act can be applied to the debtor and, if so, apply the provisions accordingly and within the discretion of the presiding officer.
Analysis
From the above discussion 110 it should be clear that current South African procedures do not provide adequate debt relief to consumers. Because sequestration is an expensive procedure to follow and because of the advantage for creditors requirement, sequestration will in many instances not provide an outcome to debtors, seeking debt relief. For the same reasons sequestration would clearly not provide an outcome to NINA debtors seeking debt relief.
As regards the administration procedure in terms of the Magistrates' Courts Act, it should be clear that it is of limited scope, since it is only available to debtors whose claims do not exceed R50 000. The procedure furthermore does not provide for a discharge of debts, because the administration order only lapses once the cost of administration and the listed creditors have been paid in full. The alternative remedy of debt review in terms of the National Credit Act is also of limited scope as it only provides debt relief in respect of debt which qualifies as 'credit agreements' in terms of the National Credit Act. The Act furthermore does not provide for the possibility that the court could force a discharge of a part of the consumer's debt obligations on the debtor's creditors. The processes of administration and debt review will therefore not provide debt relief to debtors who do not have sufficient income to repay their debt and will clearly not provide an outcome to NINA debtors.
As regards insolvency law reform initiatives and the proposed pre-liquidation composition with creditors 111 it is submitted that the main deficiency of this proposed measure 110 Paras 3.2-3.4. 111 See para 3.5.
as a viable option for a debtor seeking debt relief is that it would not, in its current format, provide such a debtor with a discharge if the composition is not accepted by the required majority of creditors.Introduction
The New Zealand Insolvency Act 113 makes provision for bankruptcy as well as alternative measures 114 in the form of proposals, 115 summary instalment orders, 116 and the no asset procedure. 117 New Zealand was the first jurisdiction to specifically provide for the NINA debtor. The following discussion briefly sets out the bankruptcy-and alternative procedures where after the no asset procedure is discussed in more detail. It is important to view the system holistically to understand where and how the no asset procedure fits into the broader personal insolvency law.
Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy may be applied for by creditors or the debtor him-or herself. A creditor applies to court 118 and the debtor to the assignee. 119 All provable debt is included 120 in the procedure and is generally automatically discharged after a period of three years. 121 Provable debts are those which the bankrupt owes at time of adjudication or thereafter but before discharge. 122 Secured debt, however, receives special treatment. Secured creditors have a number of options at their disposal. 123 They can realise the property, 124 value the property and prove in bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor for the balance, 125 or surrender the property to the assignee and prove in bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor for the whole of the outstanding amount. 126 On adjudication, all property belonging to the bankrupt vests in the assignee. 127 There are substantial personal restrictions on a bankrupt such as a restriction on entering business without the consent of the assignee 128 or to travel overseas under certain circumstances.
129
In New Zealand, the role of the assignee is expanded under the 2006 Act and bankruptcy is now mostly an administrative procedure. The office of the assignee nowadays provides for a state-funded 'one stop shop' for insolvent debtors. Under the new Act, the assignee assumes responsibility for various matters that previously fell within the jurisdiction of the courts. 130 However, Telfer notes that there might potentially be conflicts of interest as the '[a]ssignee will play the role of fact finder, adjudicator and creditor representative, as well as a counsellor to the debtor'. 131
Proposals
As an alternative to bankruptcy a person who is unable to pay his or her debts 132 may make a proposal to creditors for the payment or satisfaction of the insolvent's debts.
133
Such proposals may include various schemes, 134 must be in the prescribed form accompanied by a statement of affairs 135 and must be filed at court. 136 The proposal will name a trustee that becomes the provisional trustee and who must call a meeting of creditors to vote on the proposal. 137 Three-quarters in value and the majority in number of creditors must accept the proposal whereafter it must be approved by a court. 138 The court must hear objections by creditors before approving the proposal. 139 If the court approves the proposal, it binds all creditors whose debts are provable and are affected and creditors may not take enforcement steps without the court's permission. 140 Even though creditors may not apply for the debtor's adjudication without the court's consent whilst the proposal remains in force, 141 the insolvent may file such an application which will effectively cancel the proposal. 142 Once the proposal is approved, the insolvent must put the proposal into effect 143 and the trustee must administer property in accordance there-131 ibid. See also 256-60. 132 S 325(2) determines that debt has the same meaning as provable debts in bankruptcy. 133 Ss 325 and 326. 134 The proposal may be an offer to pay debts in instalments or to compromise the debts at less than 100 cents in the dollar -s 326(2). 135 
Summary instalment orders
The second alternative personal insolvency procedure takes the form of a summary instalment order. The debtor or a creditor, with the debtor's consent, may apply to the assignee for such an order. 147 It is an order by the assignee and takes the form of a repayment plan whereby the assignee may order the debtor to pay debts in instalments (or otherwise), either in full or to the extent that it is considered practical in the circumstances. 148 The procedure generally is for a period of 3 years and may be extended to 5 years under special circumstances. 149 Application should take place in the prescribed form and if the debtor is the applicant, should include extensive information, such as whether the debtor proposes to pay creditors in full or otherwise, details pertaining to the payment, the proposed supervisor or reasons why such supervision will not be nec- earnings and employment. 150 The assignee may make the order if the total unsecured debt, excluding student loans, is NZ$40 000 or less and the debtor cannot immediately repay the debt. 151 The assignee may make additional orders regarding future earnings, the disposal of goods and the powers of the appointed supervisor -if a supervisor was appointed. 152 The supervisor must supervise the debtor's compliance with the order 153 and may charge the debtor for his or her services. 154 He or she must provide the assignee with documents if so requested and the appointment may be terminated by the assignee under certain circumstances. 155 Once the order has been granted, a creditor may not commence or continue enforcement proceedings unless the permission of the assignee was obtained or the debtor is in default under the order. 156 The debtor's name will be included in a public register of debtors subject to the order. 157 Money paid by the debtor will be distributed firstly to pay administration costs, then that of the assignee and thirdly debts in accordance with the order. 158 Once these liabilities have been paid in full, the debtor is discharged from unsecured debts to which the order relates.
159
There is a presumption that a debtor who defaults under the order has been able to pay and has refused or neglected to do so. Once a debtor is in default, enforcement proceed- ings may begin or continue. 160 The debtor commits an offence if he or she incurs a liability of more than NZ$ 1000 without proper prior disclosure. 
Objectives of procedure
The no asset procedure is provided for by part 5 subparagraph 4 of the Insolvency Act which consists of sections 361 to 377B. It offers a debt relief procedure to a debtor 'who has no realisable assets' and 'does not have the means of repaying any amount towards those debts'.
162
Josling summarises the policy behind the procedure as follows: 163 The basic policy behind the procedure is that the full bankruptcy process, with its duration, and consequential restrictions, is no longer appropriate to small debtors.
These debtors, it is said, are typically always struggling to pay their debts, and are usually pushed into bankruptcy by some unfortunate event. In bankruptcy a dividend is hardly ever paid to creditors. Thus the justifications combine economic, humanitarian, and practical rationales.
It seems that one of the major driving forces behind the introduction of the no asset procedure was the need to channel assetless insolvents to a more appropriate debt relief measure, as they previously mainly opted for bankruptcy which is not suited to these 160 estates. 164 Guest notes that the reform appears to distinguish between those who became insolvent due to irresponsible trading and those, usually consumers, who become overindebted to such a degree that public interest calls for a fresh start and that the more punitive measures in the Act will only apply to the so called 'irresponsible'. 165 The author also refers to the belief that the no asset procedure will have a considerably reduced amount of social stigma attached to it. 
Entry requirements
Given the fact that the no asset procedure remains for a 12-month period, as opposed to the three-year period under bankruptcy, Parliament has set up strict entry criteria in order to prevent abuse.
167
A debtor can secure entry to the procedure on application to the assignee by completing and filing an application form as well as a statement of affairs. 168 Entry criteria can be divided into criteria relating to the debtor's objective financial position and those relating to his or her conduct. The assignee may admit or refuse the debtor depending on its satisfaction on whether the criteria have been met on reasonable grounds. 169 The financial requirements are that the debtor has no realisable assets 170 and that the total debt is have the means of repaying any amount towards such debts. 172 Further criteria are that the debtor should not previously have been admitted to the no asset procedure 173 or been adjudicated bankrupt. 174 The debtor is disqualified from entry and the assignee must not admit a debtor to the no asset procedure:
a. if the debtor has concealed assets with the intention to defraud creditors; there is a likelihood that the outcome will be materially better than under the no asset procedure.
178
Once a debtor has applied for entry, the assignee must, as soon as practicable, send a summary of the debtor's assets and liabilities to all known creditors. 179 A debtor must not obtain further credit after he or she has applied for the procedure.
180
A debtor is admitted to the procedure when the assignee sends a written notice to such effect to the debtor. The assignee must notify creditors and advertise that the debtor has been admitted to the no asset procedure. 181 The assignee must maintain a public register of persons admitted to and discharged from the procedure. 
Effect of Entry
Creditors are affected by the no asset procedure as there is an effective moratorium on the enforcement of debt. A creditor may not begin or continue to recover or enforce debt once a debtor has been admitted to the procedure. Debts that may not be enforced are those which were owed on the date of application and would be provable under bank- debtor. The latter must notify the assignee as soon as possible of a change in circumstances that would allow the debtor to repay an amount towards the debts under the procedure and must not obtain credit of more than NZ$1 000 without first informing the credit provider that he or she is subject to the no asset procedure. 187 If the debtor obtains such credit without the necessary disclosure, the debtor commits an offence which is punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of one year or a maximum fine of NZ$5 000 or both. 
Termination and Discharge
Termination of the procedure, except termination by discharge, lifts the moratorium on the enforceability of debt. The debtor will also be liable to pay penalties and interest that may have accrued whilst the procedure was in force.
189
The procedure can be terminated upon the happening of various events, for example by and under the discretion of the assignee, the debtor's discharge, the debtor's application for his or her own adjudication or the application for adjudication by a credit provider that is entitled to do so. 190 The assignee may terminate the no asset procedure where the debtor was wrongly admitted (for example where the debtor concealed assets or misled the assignee) or the assignee is satisfied that the financial circumstances have changed to such an extent that the debtor can repay an amount towards the debt. Termination by the assignee takes place by sending a notice to the debtor and becomes effective when the notice is sent, irrespective of whether it is received by the debtor. The assignee must thereafter also notify known creditors. 191 If the assignee terminated the participation on the ground that the debtor has concealed assets or misled the assignee, the court, on application by the assignee, may make a preservation order 192 on terms and conditions that the court sees fit, pending an application of the debtor's adjudication. 193 A creditor may apply to the assignee for termination where the creditor objects on grounds that the debtor did not meet the entry requirements or where there are reasonable grounds for the assignee to conclude that the debtor was disqualified on grounds in terms of section 364. 194 The first three grounds for disqualification in terms of section 364 relate to dishonesty, while the fourth ground refers to the situation where a creditor intends to apply for the debtor's adjudication as a bankrupt and the outcome would likely be better under bankruptcy than under the no asset procedure. It is therefore clear that this avenue will still be available to creditors after the no asset procedure has commenced. If a creditor discovers that bankruptcy may be more beneficial, the creditor may apply to the assignee for termination and apply for the debtor's adjudication as a bankrupt.
is satisfied that the 12-month period should be extended to appropriately consider whether the procedure should be terminated and the assignee has sent a notice of deferral to the debtor. The notice 195 must indicate the alternative date for automatic discharge, which must not be more than 25 working days after expiry of the 12-month period. The debtor will be automatically discharged on the date stated in the notice. 196 The assignee must also send a deferral notice to known creditors.
197
Upon discharge, the debtor's debts that became unenforceable are cancelled and the debtor is not liable to pay any part thereof. This includes penalties and interest. The discharge does not apply to debt or liability incurred by fraud or fraudulent breach of trust or for which the debtor has obtained forbearance through fraud. These debts and liabilities become enforceable on discharge and the debtor is also liable for penalties and interest. 198 Finally, the discharge relates to the debtor only and not to business partners, co-trustees, guarantors or any person jointly bound or who had made any contract with the discharged debtor.
199
Telfer comments that the difference between the 3-year discharge period in bankruptcy and the 12-month period in the no asset procedure may lead to possible abuse of the no asset procedure in order to 'fast track' the discharge. Clearly, the bigger the inconsistency between the two procedures, the greater the need for resources to ensure that the sys- 195 The notice is effective whether the debtor receives it or not -s 377(4). 196 The notice may be revoked, in which case the debtor is automatically discharged on expiry of the 12-month period -if the notice was revoked prior to that date. If that is not the case, the debtor will be discharged on the date of revocation. 197 tem is not misused. 200 In this regard the Act contains strict provisions to prevent such abuse in some instances by requiring significant investigation by the assignee.
Lessons, recommendations and conclusions
It seems that one of the major driving forces behind the introduction of the no asset procedure in New Zealand was the need to channel assetless insolvents to a more appropriate debt relief measure, as they previously mainly opted for bankruptcy which, due to its duration and consequential restrictions, is not suited to such estates. 201 South Africa, in contrast, does not have any procedure available to such consumers. Moreover, the NI-NA debtors in South Africa are in a much worse position than the NINA debtor in New
Zealand prior to the introduction of the no asset procedure. New Zealand NINA debtors had an option in the form of bankruptcy which could have resulted in a fresh start as the procedure does not contain an advantage for creditors requirement. In South Africa, NINA debtors will not qualify for straight bankruptcy (sequestration) under the Insolvency Act as they will not be able to prove an advantage to creditors. 202 They furthermore will not qualify for debt review under the National Credit Act as they will not be able to make viable proposals to service their debt. 203 In some instances they will also not be able to qualify for administration under the Magistrates' Courts Act as their debt might be more than R50 000. 204 In practice, creditors will obtain judgment against such will be obtained. 205 Furthermore, as these debtors do not have any procedural remedy at their disposal, coupled with the possibility of a judgment and an almost definite emoluments attachment order, 206 the dual economy is re-enforced, which contributes to keeping the 'poor' in a state of poverty. Thus, just as New Zealand was in need of a more appropriate measure, South Africa is in desperate need of a procedure to cater for NINA debtors.
The reasons for the recent reform of the New Zealand insolvency system and the introduction of the no asset procedure are important when considering the introduction of a no asset procedure in South Africa. South Africa can learn from New Zealand in that it
is not sensible to put a no asset debtor through a costly bankruptcy procedure. As the sequestration process is an expensive one to follow, 207 we believe that it should only be resorted to if it is cost effective to do so, that is, if the proceeds of the free residue would be sufficient to cover the costs of sequestration and to provide a non-negligible dividend to creditors. The advantage for creditors requirement fulfils an important function in this regard and it is submitted that the solution to the NINA cases should rather be found in an alternative measure. submitted that it is not necessary to redraft the entire content and structure of the current measures in order to reach these objectives. Existing alternative procedures should rather be combined, further developed and added to in order to provide a more accessible, effective and non-discriminate system. 209 We believe that a combination of the best elements of the current two statutory repayment measures, debt review and administration, will go a long way towards improving the system. All consumers who can at least pay something towards their debts should have access to the reformed repayment procedure. The procedure should make provision for a discharge and maximum time frames. 210 Judgment debt should also be included. At present, judgment debt forms part of both the sequestration and administration procedures, but for reasons unknown, cannot be included under debt review. However, secured debt should not form part of the reformed repayment procedure. Creditors' opposition to debt review applications are mainly due to the fact that such creditors are locked into the procedure and can therefore not rely on their securities for satisfaction of the outstanding amounts. The inclusion of secured debt can, as is the case under the National Credit Act at present, unnecessarily complicate the process, increase the total costs of the procedure and annul the very notion of security. Though it is somewhat incomprehensible to contemplate absolutely no court involvement within the South African insolvency regime at present, it is submitted that investigation into at least the reduction of court involvement should be undertaken. 211 However, this will only be possible once the best suited regulator 212 for the re-formed repayment procedure has been established and its functions have been expanded which in itself calls for intensive further research.
Even if the suggested reform does take place, neither sequestration nor the suggested reformed repayment plan, will be specifically suited to the needs of NINA debtors. The proposed pre-liquidation composition 213 will also not be an option for the NINA debtor as there will probably be nothing that can be offered to creditors. 214 We therefore support the idea of introducing a separate procedure for the NINA debtors in South Africa as is the case in New Zealand. It is acknowledged that the two jurisdictions differ in their socio-economic and cultural backgrounds and that a foreign system should not be wholly transplanted without taking cognisance of these factors. However, it is submitted that the need for a no asset procedure is even more pressing in the context of a develop- In considering a separate no asset procedure in South Africa, we are in agreement with
Telfer, 216 that the larger the inconsistency between procedures, the greater caution and need for resources to ensure that the system is not misused. Our suggestion is therefore that, should South Africa consider a no asset procedure, the procedure should as far as practically and reasonably possible be akin to that under the sequestration and the reformed repayment procedure.
Whereas the majority of the insolvency procedures in New Zealand are now administrative in nature and are channelled through the office of the assignee, 217 that seems to be strategically well positioned for this task, the South African position is more complicated due to the multiplicity of existing regulators. These regulators also resorts under different government departments, 218 which further complicates matters. It is submitted that further investigation and research are necessary in order to establish the most suitable government department and consequently, regulator for the proposed no asset procedure.
When contemplating the form and structure of a no asset procedure in South Africa, we suggest the following: When considering the introduction of a no asset procedure, the most important consideration is the possible impact on the broader South African community and economy.
Although it is true that the system will be abused by some, possible abuse is not an excuse for not providing equal treatment (as far as possible) to all over-indebted or insolvent South African consumers. Safety measures 219 should be built into the procedure to minimise possible abuse, but this should not frustrate the objectives of a cost effective measure. Even though introducing a no asset measure will have an impact on the economy, it would be more expensive to keep these consumers in their desperate situations, thereby totally excluding them from the formal sector and economy.
No legislative provision will be able to alleviate poverty. However, we believe that the system can keep debtors in a state of poverty and further entrench the dichotomy between the 'haves' and the 'have nots'. By removing these obstacles from the system and 219 See eg the entry requirements iro the New Zealand no asset procedure (para 4.5.2) and the provisions in respect of the discharge and termination of the procedure (para 4.5.4). The World Bank suggests the careful design and implementation of suitable access requirements for access to a procedure as well as for a discharge. Proper access requirements combined with cautious monitoring by administrators and creditors will minimise moral hazard and debtor fraud. See The World Bank (n 11) 41-42.
